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Yel'tsin's Plan & Chechnya's Peace 
By IGOR ROTAR
Izvestia
The recent renewal of the wide-scale Russian offensive against the regions controlled 
by the Chechen resistance coincided with the formation of the special presidential 
commission to stabilize the situation in Chechnya. The Russian military became 
especially active after President Yel'tsin set a March 31 deadline for promulgating his 
new plan concerning the peaceful resolution of the Chechen conflict. The military 
leaders were trying to secure the greatest gains possible, before any talks could be 
launched or moratoria on combat operations could be put into effect.
Hoping to alter dramatically the situation in Chechnya, the Russian military returned to 
the well-tested tactics of the nineteenth century. The Chechen home guards were 
squeezed out of the lowlands into the mountainous regions; to deny them supplies of 
food and ammunition, nearby villages were destroyed. General Aleksei Yermolov, the 
commander of Russian forces in the Caucasus (from 1816 to 1827) famous for his 
pathological cruelty, pioneered the practice now being followed.
Negotiations Strengthen Resistance Forces
The Russian Federation tried the 'gendarme of the Caucasus' method earlier in the war, 
before June 1995. In the spring, Russian forces had taken control of virtually all the 
inhabited regions of Chechnya.
Having visited Dudayev's bases during this period, I can testify that his forces were in a 
very sorry state. They were experiencing extreme shortages not only of ammunition but 
also of the most basic provisions. Shamil Basayev saved the Chechen resistance in 
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June, by seizing a hospital in the Russian city of Budennovsk, and forcing Moscow to 
the negotiating table.
Though doomed from the outset, the negotiations dragged on all summer. In essence, 
the opposing sides were irreconcilable: the Russians insisted on the territorial integrity 
of Russia, while Chechens would agree to cease armed resistance only if the 
independent Chechen Republic were recognized.(1)
Still, the negotiations brought tangible gains to the defenders of Chechen 
independence. For the duration of the talks, the sides established a moratorium on 
military action, which was observed with only a few violations. In the meantime, 
Dudayev's fighters not only renewed their strength, but returned in the guise of peaceful 
inhabitants to the very villages from which they had been expelled by Russian forces.
In March 1996, nearly a year later, as Yel'tsin prepared to announce his plan for the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict, his generals were returning to their old tactics.
Superfluous Witnesses? 
Journalists on assignment in Chechnya cannot fail to notice that their professional 
duties have become drastically more difficult to carry out since the appointment of Lt. 
General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov as commander of the Russian United Group of Forces 
in Chechnya.
Until recently, journalists had complete freedom of movement in Chechnya. Then in 
December 1995, when Russian artillery leveled the city of Gudermes, the military's new 
policy toward the press became apparent: journalists still have not been granted access 
to the city. Correspondents resorted to standing next to Russian posts on the roads 
leading to Gudermes and interviewing those few survivors who by some miracle had 
managed to escape.
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Since then journalists have been barred from every single village destroyed by Russian 
forces. Reporters are prohibited from entering those villages even weeks after the 
storming, long after the danger has passed. For instance, we are still barred from 
Pervomayskoye, although it was taken three months ago. Likewise, Sernovodsk, taken 
by the federal forces a month ago, remains off-limits. Under the constitution these 
actions, at the very least towards journalists who are Russian citizens, are illegal. The 
stipulation in the Constitution that citizens can travel unhindered anywhere in the 
country remains in force since a state of emergency was never put into effect in 
Chechnya.
New limitations on the mass media were introduced in March. Now all journalists 
working in Chechnya must obtain two accreditations, one from the plenipotentiary 
representative of the Russian Government in Chechnya, the other from the regional 
MVD. The MVD is instructed to detain journalists traveling in Chechnya without 
accreditation.
The Russian military also hinders the activities of international relief organizations. We 
still have no information regarding the fate of the remaining inhabitants of Sernovodsk 
because relief workers have been prevented from entering the settlement, despite the 
fact that the bombardment ceased on March 4, although the "clean up" operation 
continues. As a result, the representatives of Medecins sans Frontiers (Doctors Without 
Borders) have little choice but to wait for refugees to reach them at the military cordons. 
Meanwhile the civilian population, abandoned in the rubble of Sernovodsk, remains 
without humanitarian supplies or medical attention.
Members of Doctors Without Borders, based in the Ingushetia capital Nazran, have 
appealed repeatedly to the military leadership. Their communique stresses that the 
military's denial of access to civilians who are exposed to danger as a result of combat 
operations is contrary to the long-standing international practice of allowing unhindered 
access for independent humanitarian organizations.
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"Russia violates the Geneva Accords, which it has signed ! " says Doctors Without 
Borders coordinator in Nazran, Grazelle Goden, " I cannot understand why they so 
stubbornly hamper our efforts to deliver first aid to wounded civilians among the local 
population. I think they are simply afraid that we will see what they are doing."
The military's tactics in dealing with the press are readily understood. In the nineteenth 
century Russia could annihilate mountain villages without reaction from international 
public opinion; today the same barbaric tactics threaten to leave the country isolated. In 
the winter of 1994-1995, when Russian aviation and artillery virtually wiped the 
Chechen capital, Grozny, off the face of the earth, journalists reporting from the scene 
made the facts known worldwide, causing embarrassment for the military. Moreover, 
Russia's admission to the Council of Europe was postponed due to international outrage 
over its methods in Chechnya. (2)
The upcoming presidential elections also give impetus to new restrictions on the press. 
The government, deeply in need of Western support, does not want footage of 
decimated villages to distract from Yel'tsin's campaigning. It would be particularly 
undesirable to allow the mass media to present the facts of the Russian military killing 
civilians on the eve of the president's unveiling of his policy for the peaceful resolution of 
the conflict.
However, it seems that the efforts of the military breed contrary results; it is simply 
impossible to isolate the journalists. One can often find an alternative route to the 
'closed' settlements that has not been blocked by the military. Of course, there is also 
the nearly universal corruptibility of the federal forces. One is hard pressed to find a 
guard on post who would refuse a bribe; the amount of the bribe is the only issue. Since 
the soldiers often fear letting journalists through, it is best to tell them you are simply 
visiting. Refugees fleeing their villages constitute another source of first-hand 
information, however, they often overestimate the extent of the damage and the number 
killed.
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As a result, the world still learns of the events in the combat zone, but since the 
information mainly comes from refugees, the federal forces are seen in a very negative 
light. Moreover, when reporters succeed in gaining access, they never fail to mention 
that the military tried to conceal the extent of the destruction and the number of victims.
Effects of Combat on Other Republics
Heightened tensions in the neighboring regions of Ingushetia and Dagestan are the 
natural outcome of Russian military's tactics in Chechnya. Operating from the central 
regions of Chechnya, the federal forces push the resistance fighters out to the west and 
east, that is to the borders with Ingushetia and Dagestan.
Today Russian forces are simply unable to control fully the Chechen border; they cannot 
stop Dudayev's fighters from entering the neighboring regions. Under these 
circumstances, accidental (or not)artillery bombardment of the thus far non- rebellious 
republics becomes practically unavoidable. Consequently, the threat of combat actions 
expanding to the interior of neighboring republics grows daily.
Currently combat actions continue within a few kilometers of the Ingush border. Already 
there have been several cases where combat has spilled into that republic. When the 
federal forces bomb a Dudayev base in Bamut from Ingush territory, some of the shells 
fall on the Ingush settlement Arshty. In one incident in early March near Arshty, 
Dudayev's fighters ambushed a column of Russian APCs. In the course of the ensuing 
battle, Russian artillery let loose a torrent of fire into Arshty, where some of the 
resistance fighters had retreated, causing the deaths of several inhabitants of the 
village.
Today Ingushetia's population of 200,000 is giving shelter to 100,000 refugees. "From 
the start of the war in Chechnya our republic has been awash in successive waves of 
refugees" says the director of the Ministry for Emergency Situations of Ingushetia, 
Mohammed Yevloyev.
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"At one point we had almost 200,000 refugees from Chechnya, but gradually some of 
them started to return. Now we are experiencing a new wave; just in the last few days 
20,000 refugees from Sernovodsk and Samashki," Yevloyev says. "Judging from the 
behavior of the federal forces, this wave won't be the last. We do not have the 
resources to accept such large numbers of refugees. Already we have resorted to 
placing people in clubhouses and garages. We have put up tents for about a hundred 
more near the Sleptzovsky settlement. Social tensions are rising. It seems that certain 
forces in Moscow are doing everything to pull us into the war."
Dagestan can compete with Ingushetia in the amount of suffering inflicted by the 
Chechen conflict. The situation is most explosive in the Novolarsky region. Federal 
forces bomb Chechen territory from the mountains in Dagestan. It is difficult to judge 
whether the Russians have deliberately targeted settlements in Dagestan, but in recent 
days six people have been killed, among them four children. Settlements near the 
Chechen border--Ahar, Shushia, Chapayevka, Solnechnoye and Tychar--have been 
subjected almost daily to Russian artillery bombardments. In Shushia the village school 
has been entirely destroyed; eight private homes have sustained considerable damage.
If the current state of affairs is to anyone' s advantage, it is surely those who favor 
Chechen independence. With every passing day more and more inhabitants of 
Dagestan come to the conclusion that sooner or later they will have to fight alongside 
the resistance fighters against the federal forces.
What Lies Ahead?
President Yel'tsin's program for settling the war in Chechnya holds little promise of 
altering the situation in any fundamental way. Yel'tsin's current effort diverges little from 
last summer's initiative; already in July 1995 the Agreement on Military Questions 
provided for the gradual withdrawal of Russian forces.
Under the terms of the agreement Russia can station permanently one infantry brigade 
(the 205th motorized brigade of the 58th army) and one MVD brigade on the territory of 
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Chechnya. According to subsequent negotiations, both brigades were to be required to 
remain in their assigned zones and not travel freely throughout Chechnya. Last summer 
Dudayev's side did not oppose holding parliamentary elections, with the caveat that 
elections could be held only after the withdrawal of Russian forces. Of course, not one 
of those provisions was put into effect and the sides locked horns over the basic issue: 
the status of Chechnya. It seems that until this question is resolved the provisions of 
other agreements cannot be implemented.
Now, nearly a year later, it looks as though we have come full circle. Russia still insists 
on its territorial integrity and offers Chechnya wide powers within the Russian 
Federation. The position of the resistance likewise remains adamant; Chechnya is an 
independent state. As Yel'tsin unveils the latest peace initiative, there is little reason to 
believe that a program closely resembling last summer's failed initiatives has any 
greater chance of success.
Some analysts, including Yevgeni Kiselev of "Itogi," argue that Yel'tsin's willingness to 
hold talks with resistance fighters spells a major departure from earlier efforts and 
bodes real hope for a peaceful solution. However, indirect talks would not in themselves 
signal a major breakthrough, since such talks were held last summer. Arkadi Volsky, the 
Chairman of Russia's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, served as moderator 
and met with Dudayev last July.
Thus far the possibility of holding direct talks between Yel'tsin and Chechen resistance 
leaders remains remote. It is more likely that talks conducted through intermediaries will 
be so tangled and inconclusive that they will reach a deadlock long before any meeting 
between the leaders can take place. Even if such a meeting occurs, it would hardly 
resolve the ultimate question: the status of Chechnya.
So it seems that Yel'tsin's latest initiative represents little more than a pre-election 
gimmick. According to General Lev Rokhlin, the chairman of the Duma Defense 
Committee and a former commander of one of the Russian divisions fighting in 
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Chechnya, "As soon as we squeeze the Dudayevites into the mountains, negotiations 
begin and with them a moratorium on combat operations. Dudayev's men renew their 
strength and gradually return to the low-lying regions. Negotiations break down, we 
resume combat actions to drive them out of the same regions. The cycle is repeated 
anew!"
Notes:
1. Chechnya declared independence before the Russian Federation came into 
existence following the dissolution of the USSR -- ed. 
2. Although it joined the Council of Europe in January 1996, in its attacks against 
Chechen civilians, Russia continues to violate the Council's tenets -- ed.
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